The following is a summary of Zhou Li-an's comments made during a panel discussion at the Sixth Annual Conference of Government and Economics held at Tsinghua University, Beijing, on April 27, 2024. Dr. Zhou is Professor of Applied Economics at Peking University's Guanghua School of Management.

On April 27, 2024, the Sixth Annual Conference of Government and Economics, co-hosted by the Society for the Analysis of Government and Economics (SAGE) along with Tsinghua University's School of Social Sciences and the Academic Center for Chinese Economic Practice and Thinking (ACCEPT), was convened on campus at Tsinghua University. Zhou Li-an, Professor of Applied Economics at Peking University's Guanghua School of Management, joined SAGE Co-President and ACCEPT Director David Daokui Li alongside a panel of distinguished guests for a roundtable discussion after the conclusion of opening remarks and keynote speeches.

Zhou Li-an observed that the core feature of high-quality economic development lies in undergoing a shift from a singular goal in pursuit of economic growth to the incorporation of multiple goals. The same competitive "tournament" between local government still exists as before, but now the specific aspects being targeted are more diverse. More than a decade ago, competition between local governments revolved around the promotion of economic growth, such that "one merit overshadowed a multitude of demerits" for those regions whose economies were growing at a rapid pace; whereas now these regions have to take a larger number of indicators into consideration, such as the ecological environment and production safety. As for what kind of incentives this new mode of competition will present to local officials, or how the "tournament" system will be redesigned to serve the goal of high-quality economic development, at present it remains unclear.

The "tournament" system for the promotion of local officials in China stems from the country's own unique political system and political environment, which cannot be replicated in other countries that have adopted Western-style democracy. Given that this model is underpinned by a rigid "hierarchical structure of higher and lower levels of government, the higher levels of government can influence the incentives of lower levels of government by establishing key indicators for evaluating their performance, with such features being uncharacteristic of Western countries.